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87 S.Ct. 824]. (See also Ross v. California (1968) 391 U.S.
470 [20 L.Ed.2d 750, 88 S.Ct. 1850].)
JYlcCOMB, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I dissent from
the reversal of the judgIllent imposing the death penalty for
the reason that, in my opinion, the error complained of did
not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. CDnst., art. VI,
~ 13.)
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 1969.
l\losk, J., did not participate therein. Traynor, C. J., and
Peters, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be
granted.

[Crim. No. 11170.

In Bank. Apr. 11, 1969.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. MARK C.
OSUNA and JACK R. GORMAN, Defendants and Appellants.
[la,

Ib] Criminal Law-Evidence-Identification-Voice.-The
pretrial identification procedure as to a codefendant charged
with robbery-murder was not so suggestive as to give rise to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification and the use of such
identification, and an in-court identification based thereon did
not deny due process of law, where one victim of the robbery
who had heard the robbers talk for over two hours at the
crime seene but had not seen them unmasked testified that he
identified codefendant at the district attorney's office first by
standing outside the door and listening to him talk with the
district attorney for 10 or 15 minutes, and then by coming
into the office and confronting him, voice identification before
confrontation being reasonable under such circumstances;
where, although it might have been prefereable to have se\T.
eral persons speak, in view of the time the witness was able to
hear the robbers talk during the crime, it was not unreason·

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 179; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 368.
licK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 374(4); [2] Crimi.
~l~l Law, § 107 (1.5); [3] Criminal Law, § 454.5; [4] Criminal Law,
~_3!)l (3); [5J Criminal Law, § 627 (1); [6J Criminal Law, § 1382(4) ;
(.'! ~rill1illal Law, § 1011(6); [8] ~:illlinal Law, § 329~1~ (d); [9]
J ~l1l111al Law, § 104(1); [10] HomIcIde, § 189; [11] CrImmal Law,
116(1); [12] Criminal Law, § 791; [13] Jury, § 44.
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able to have him confront a single suspect; and where there
was nothing in the record to show that the district attorney in
any way suggested the witness' response.
[2] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Police Lineup.-The
otherwise admissible pretrial identification of a defendant who
did not have the assistance of counsel at the time was not
thereby rendered inadmissible where the identification took
place before the decisions of Wade and Gilbert.
[3] Id.-Evidence-Declarations and Admissions of Codefendant.
-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, statements of defendant and codefendant in conversations with
their friends or confederates which took place on the day of
the killing while defendants were still at large were common
admissions of both and therefore admissible against both,
where during the conversations each defendant recounted
various details of the crimes, and had one disagreed with what
the other said, it was reasonable to assume that he would ha\'e
said so.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes-Connecting Defendant With
Crime Charged.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two
defendants, the probative value of evidence of a prior burglary
committed by them consisting of the testimony of an accomplice to the burglary, which was corroborated by other evidence
connecting defendants with guns taken during such burglary,
outweighed any possible prejudicial effect the evidence might
have had, where the evidence was relevant to show that
defendants had the guns used in the charged robbe~ and
murder, and played a significant part in completing a chain of
physical evidence that could dispel any doubt with respeet to
identification of defendants or the testimony of witnesses 1rbo
were or may have been accomplices.
[5] Id. - Conduct of Counsel- Scope of Concluding Argum8l1t ....._Comments on Witness.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of
two defendants, the prosecutor's error in closing argument la
misstating the record of a witness who had acted as look08'
for the robbery was not prejudicial, where the
purpose was to rebut a possible inference that the lVibltestified pursuant to a bargain with the prosecution,wbereobjection was made, and where a timely admonition could . ...
corrected any effect the misstatement could have had.
... . .
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Error B~
in View of Evidence as a Whole.-In a robbery-murder ~.
. cution of two defendants, it was not prejudicial error to ~
a female witness in whose apartment the robbery haa ....planned to testify that she was afraid of codefendant ~

argum.'-'

[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 432.5; Am.Jur.2d, E,i.....
§ 610.
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he told her and others that he had been imprisoned for
cutting off a woman's breast and crippling a man for life,
where there was no motion to strike or to admonish the jury
to disregard the statement, where the witness' fear was relevant on the issue of whether she was an accomplice whose
testimony would require corroboration or a person acting
innocently under "threats or menaces," where, assuming the
testimony's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value
and that its admission could not be cured by admonition, it did
not appear to have contributed ·to the jury's verdict on the
guilt issue in view of the overwhelming evidence thereof.
[7] Id.-Judgment-Determinationof Punishment Under Pen.
Code, § 190.I-Evidence as to Prior Acts.-At the trial on the
penalty issue of a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, the details of crimes for which codefendant had been
imprisoned were properly proved, and his statement to a
female witness that he had been in prison because he had cut
off a woman's breast and crippled a man for life were admissible to show his attitude toward his criminal career, although
his statement was revealed to· be a somewhat exaggerated
boast.
[8] Id.~Trial-Conduct of Judge-Comments on Evidence.-In a
robbery-murder prosecution 'of two defendants, the trial court
did not improperly indicate to the jury its belief that defendants had been proved guilty by discussing the timing of the
trial on the issue of penalty before the conclusion of the trial
on the issue of guilt, where the trial judge's remarks did not
indicate that he believed that there would be a trial on the
penalty issue but merely set forth for the convenience of
the jury how long such a trial would take if it occurred.
[9] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Suppression of Evidence.
.. -,-Ina robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, . there
was no suppression of evidence by the prosecution that certain
witnesses were subpoenaed from outside the state, assertedly
relevant to show the witnesses' flight which would in turn
support an inference that they were accomplices, where the
SUbpoenaing, of the witnesses was a matter of record readily
available to the defense.
[10] Homicide-Instructions-Second Degree Murder.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two' defendants, the trial court
properly refused to instruct on second degree murder where
there was no evidence that the homicide was other than a first
degree robbery murder.
[11] Criminal Law-Instructions-Requests-E:ffect of Failure to
ltequest.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants,
no error appeared in the court's instruction on evidence of a
prior burglary committed by defendants which was adequate
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for a proper consideration of the evidence thereof, where
defendants did not request a more detailed instruction, and the
instruction offered by the prosecution was not appropriate to
the facts of the case.
[12] Id.-Instructions-Burden of Proof-Sufficiency of Instruction.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, the
court's references to finding defendants innocent rather than
not guilty were in no way misleading and did not indicate that
defendants had any burden to prove themselves innocent,
where the court clearly instructed that a finding of innocence
would be compelled by the failure of the prosecution to prove
guilt to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt.
[13] Jury-Qualification-Implied Bias-Scruples Against Capital
Punishment.-In a robbery-murder prosecution of two defendants, although there was no prejudicial error at the trial on
the issue of guilt, Witherspoon error compelled reversal of the
judgment imposing the death penalty where seven of 20 prospective jurors excused for cause on voicing objections to the
death penalty did not make unmistakably clear that they
would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be
developed at the trial, or that their attitude toward the death
penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to defendants' guilt.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin
County. Thomas F. Keating, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Prosecution for first degree murder. Judgment of convietion imposing the death penalty as to each defendant reversed
as to penalty only; in all other respects affirmed.
- - --------]
Mark C. Osuna, in pro. per., Andrew P. SmirnofI and A.,~
Leonard Bjorklund, Jr., under appointments by the Supre~_!i\t
Court, for Defendants and Appellants.::Zi~~
>

~'.;');$l:~:

Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. HarrisJJr,·/":t
Assistant Attorney General, Derald E. Granberg and Robert-'
R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiffan8
Respondent.

e

--

TRA YNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendants guilty of tltf

[13] Capital punishment beliefs as disqnalifying juror in cap~:
ease for cause, 48 A.L.R.2d 560. See also Cal.Jur.2d, .Tury, § •
Am. JUT .TU1'y (rev ed § lR6 et seq).

[70 C.2d
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eof, where
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first degree murder of Mario Ferrari and fixed the penalty for
each at death. The trial court denied motions for a new trial
and entered judgment on the verdicts. The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
of InstrucThe homicide occurred at the Mission Inn, a restaurant and
ndants, the
bar in San Rafael. About 12 :40 a.m. on September 6, 1965,
ather than
dicate that
Leo Albertoni, a co-owner and the chef of the Mission Inn,
.innocent,
left the kitchen to go to his apartment upstairs at the back of
Innocence
the inn. On the way he was knocked down by a blow to the
n to prove
back of his neck. He got to his feet, and two hooded men
uht.
confronted him with pistols. They tied his hands with wire
st Capital
and told him they wanted the safe opened and would kill him
wo defend.
if he did not cooperate.
he trial on .
Albertoni did not remember the combination of the safe but
rsal of the
t.old the robbers that it was written on a paper somewhere on
of 20 prosthe premises. The robbers searched for the combination in
ions to the
Yain, but they found two automatic pistols, a .45 and a .32.
that they
Each took a pistol, one commenting, "It's good that we found
of capital
your guns; we will use these if there is going to be any shootmight be
the death
ing, then we will throw them away;" They also took pillows
artial decifrom a bed to be used as silencers if necessary. '
The robbers stayed with Albertoni in his apartment for over
two hours waiting for the bar to close and customers to leave.
Ie, § 1239"
About 3 a.m. they took Albertoni downstairs and ordered him
; of Marink
to call the two bartenders, Mario Ferrari and Alfred Casey,
part and~,t
from the bar. The robbers ordered the bartenders to stand
against a wall to be searched. Ferrari made a break for the
of convjc-:;~::
door, and both robbers opened fire. Ferrari got to the strf'et
It reversed/where he fell fatally wounded. Albertoni escaped from the
'-'--'~.:;~~ .,----, ",building, and as he did"so;-hesawthe robbers 'take the 're,;;--

'J'
"

and
).:;r
~ Suprellle,l~";

,ll'

ee!~ti:r ~~t1i~:,:r::~ti1ieddefendants Osuna and Gor-

man as the robbers. He remembered that the one he identified
as Gorman was slender, had a dark complexion, and wore
tight black pants, a black nylon windbreaker, black boots,
green gloves, and a dark hood. He carried a revolver that
Albertoni estimated to be between a .32 and a .45 caliber. The
other robber was heavier, had a light complexion, and was
OVl'r six feet tall; his eyes were light grey, flecked with red
SPl'Cks, with straight wrinkles radiating from them "like sun
rays." He carried a .22 caliber pistol with a long shiny barrl'l
an
b d 'Wore a black nylon windbreaker, light blue denim pants,
lack shoes, green gloves, and a brown-purple hood.
Albertoni's identification of defendants as the robbers and
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killers was confirmed by a mass of other evidence. Two witnesses testified that the robbery was planned in their San
Francisco apartment and that defendants were dressed as
Albertoni described them. Percell, an accomplice who acted as
a .lookout, and his girl friend, who was apparently unaware
that a robbery was planned, testified that they took defendants to the Mission Inn and after hearing shots saw defendants run out of the inn. A girl friend of Gorman's testified
that defendants told her of their plans for the robbery at her
apartment the previous afternoon and that they returned
about 5 a.m. the next morning with three guns, money, and a
money bag. Osuna described what had happened in considerable detail, but Gorman was relatively quiet. Later in the day
defendants, the accomplice and his girl friend, and one of the
women in whose -apartment the robbery was planned had
coffee together in a coffee shop where both defendants discussed the homicide in detail.
Other evidence was introduced to show that defendants got
the guns they took to the Mission Inn during a burglary at a
Sacramento home and that some of the guns that the police
recovered from various places where defendants had abandoned them after the killing had been fired at the Mission
Inn.
The only defense evidence at the trial on the issue of guilt
was introduced by Gorman to establish an alibi for the Sacramento burglary. Neither defendant testified.
[la] Gorman contends that he was denied due process of
law. by the use of Albertoni's pretrial identification and the in·
court identification based thereon. Albertoni testified that he
identified Gorman-atthedistrictattorney 's 0:ffice,-firstb1~
standing outside the door and listening to him talk with the
district attorney for ten or fifteen minutes, and then by coming into the office and confronting him. [2] Since the ideD-,
tification took place before the decisions of the United Sta~,_
Supreme Oourt in United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S.2~8f;">··
. [18' L.Ed:2d 1149, 87 S.Ot. 1926], and Gilbert v. OaliforfNl.·.f,
(1967) 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 87 8.0t. 1951], neither
the identification nor any product of it was inadmissibk
because Gorman did not have the assistance of counsel at ~
time. (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed
1199, 87 S.Ot. 1967] ; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Oal.2d 444.
448 [62 Oal.Rptr. 419,432 P.2d 21].) [lb] As in the p~
gans case, however, we have scrutinized the record ..t..
respect to the pretrial identification to determine whether.~

70 C.2d
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man was denied due process. Since Albertoni had heard the
robbers talk for over two hours but had not seen them unmasked, it was reasonable to seek a voice identification before
Albertoni confronted Gorman. It might have been preferable
to have Albertoni hear several persons speak, but in view of
the length of time he was able to hear the robbers talk during
the crime, it was not unreasonable to have him confront a single
suspect. (Cf. People v. Caruso (1968) 68 Ca1.2d 183, 188-189
[65 Cal.R.ptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336] ; Simmons v. United States
(1968) 390 U.S. 377, 385 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1254, 88 S.Ct.
967].) Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that
the district attorney in any way suggested the response Albertoni should make. We conclude that the procedure was not so
suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. (See Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S.
377, 384 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1253] ; Stovall v. Denno, supra,
388 U.S. 293, 301-302 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1205-1206].)
[3] One witness testified to one conversation and three
witnesses testified to another in which defendants discussed
the homicide. The conversations were with defendants'
friends or confederates and took place on the day of the killing while defendants were still at large. 1 Since each defendant implicated the other as well as himself, they invoke People
v. Aranda (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 518, 530-531 [47 Cal.Rptr.353,
407 P.2d 605] (see also, Bruton v. United States (1968) 391
U.S. 123 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620]), and each contends
the other's statements were inadmissible against him. There is
no merit in this contention. During each conversation both
defendants recounted various details of the crimes. Had one
disagreed with what the other said, it is reasonable to assume
that he would have said so. Under these circumstances the
statements of each were common admissions· of both, and
therefore admissible against both. (See former Code Civ.
Proc., § 1870, subd. 3; Evid. Code, § 1221; People v. Robinson
(964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 401 [38 Cal.Rptr. 890, 392 P.2d 970];
People v. Simmons (1946) 28 Ca1.2d 699, 712 [172 P.2d 18].)
[4] Defendants contend that the evidence of the Sacra~ento burglary was needlessly prejudicial. That evidence conlilsted of the testimony of an accomplice to the burglary,

-

ISince iliese conversations were initiated by defendants when they
.. ete not in custody and since there is nothing to indicate that they were
t <ltdwholly voluntary, the trial court was under no obligation sua sponte
ete:mine that the statements were voluntary before admitting them
;Q~ eVIdence. (Of. Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368 [12 L.Ed.2d
,84 S.Ot. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205].)

1It

tt
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which was corrooorated by other evidence connecting defendants with the guns taken during the burglary. Evidence of
that crime was relevant to show that defendants had the guns
used in the robbery and murder. It played a significant part
in completing a chain of physical evidence that could dispel
any doubts with respect to Albertoni's identification of
defendants or the testimony of witnesses who were or may
have been accomplices. Under these circumstances the probative value of the evidence of the burglary outweighed any
possible prejudicial effect the evidence might have had. (Peo-'
ple v. Stanley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 812, 818 [63 Cal.Rptr. 825,
433 P.2d 913].)
[5] Defendants contend that the district attorney committed prejudicial misconduct in his closing argument by telling the jury that Percell, the lookout for the Mission Inn
robbery, had been sentenced for the robbery at the :Mission
Inn, whereas in fact he had been convicted of another robbery. The purpose of the argument was to rebut a possible
inference that Percell testified pursuant to a bargain with the
prosecution. No objection was made, however, and a timely
admonition could have corrected any effect the misstatement
could have had. (See People v. Mitchell (1966) 63 Cal.2d 805,
809 [48 Cal.Rptr. 371, 409 P.2d 211].) Moreover, Percell's
testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of many
other witnesses. The error in misstating his record was Dot
prejudicial.
[6] Gorman contends that it was prejudicial error to
allow Norene ]\{ichaels, one of the women in whose apartment
the Mission Inn robbery was planned, to testify that she waI
- afraid of Gorman because he had told her andotherstbathfhad been imprisoned beca.use he cutoff a woman's breast ana
crippled a man for life. There was no motion to strike or to
admonish the jury to disregard the statement. Miss ~{ichaels'
fear of Gorman was relevant on the issue whether she was ..
accom plice whose testimony would require corroborat(Pen. Code, § 1111) or a person acting innocently una",
"threats or nlena.ces" (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. Eight). E~
if it is assumed that the prejudicial effect of Miss ~iclla~!:.
statement of her reason for fearing Gorman outweIg}led J
probative value and that a timely admonition could not
cured the error in admitting the statement, the error waJ' . '
prej~dicia1. In view of the overwhelming evide?ce t !~
convInced that the jury's knowledge of why MIss lhe

h:
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feared Gorman did not contribute to its verdict on the issue of
guilt. [7] At the trial on the issue of penalty, the details of
the crimes for which Gorman had been in prison were properly proved and his statement to Miss Michaels was revealed
to be a somewhat exaggerated boast. As such, however, it was
admissible at the trial on the issue of penalty to show his
attitude toward his criminal career. (People v. Bentley
(1962) 58 Cal.2d 458, 460-461 [24 Cal.Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d
645] .)
[8] Gorman -contends that the trial court improperly indicated to the jury its belief that defendants had been proved
guilty (see People v. Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 649 [58
Cal.R.ptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889]) by discussing the timing of the
trial on the issue of penalty before the conclusion of the trial
on the issue of guilt. There is no merit in this contention, for
the trial judge's remarks did not indicate that he believed
that there would be a trial on the issue of penal~y but merely
set forth for the convenience of the jury how long such a trial
would take if it occurred.
[9] There is also no merit in Osuna's contention, made in
propria persona, that the prosecution suppressed the fact that
certain witnesses were subpoenaed from outside the state. He
asserts that this fact would be relevant to show the witnesses'
flight, which would in turn support an inference that they
were accomplices. There was no suppression of evidence, however, for the subpoenaing of the witnesses was a matter of
record readily available to the defense.
,\Vith respect to the instructions at the trial on the issue of
guilt, it is contended that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct on second degree murder; in failing adequately to set
forth the purpose for which the evidence of the Sacramento
burglary was admitted; and in describing the jury's duty in
tenns of determining the guilt or innocence of ea.ch defendant
instead of in terms of determining whether each defendant
Was guilty or not guilty. [10] Since tber~ was no evidence
that the homicide was other than a first dE'gree robbery murder, the trial court properly refused to instruct on second
degree murder. (People v. Imbler (1962) 57 Cal.2d 711, 715
J21 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304].) [11] The court's
lJlstrUctions on the evidence of the Sacramento burglary were
adequate for a proper consideration of the evidence. Defend~nts did not request a more detailed instruction and the
lnstrUction offered by the prosecution was not appropriate to
Ule facts of the case. Accordingly, no error in this respect
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appears. (See People v. lVadc (1959) 53 Ca1.2d 322, 334 [1
Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].) [12] The court's references
to finding defendants innocent rather than not guilty were in
no way misleading and did not indicate that defendants ha.d
any burden to prove themselves innocent. Thus, the court
clearly instructed that a finding of innocence would be compelled by the failure of the prosecution to prove guilt "to a
moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt."
[13] Although there was no prejudicial error at the trial 011
the issue of guilt, the judgment imposing the death penalty
.
must be reversed because of the error condemned in lVithcrspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d
776, 784-786, 88 S. Ct. 1770]. Twenty prospective jurors
were, excused for cause who voiced objections to the death
penalty. Of these, at least seven did not make" unmistakably
clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the
imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to
the defendant's guilt." (391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.
2d 776, 785], italics in the original.)
Four prospective jurors were excused who stated that they
did not "think" that they could impose the death penalty,
but none gave an unambiguous answer to the question
whether he could or could not do so. (See People v. Cha.co.
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 765, 772-773 [73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d
106] .)
Another prospective juror was asked, ' 'Do you belie"e
. because of your feeling or objection toward the death'penaltyyou would find yourself unable to return a verdicto!
death ?"His answer, "Because of my objection to the death
penalty - , " was cut off by the prosecutor's challenge, which
was allowed without permitting the prospective juror to eo~ ..
plete his answer.
Another prospective juror stated that she was "against tht
deat.h penalty and it would affect any decision I would baw
to make." She was then asked, "On the question of guilt or
innocence or on the question of penalty and a verdict of fim
degree murder is found-." She interrupted, "Yes," aDd
the question con tin ued, "-you could not be listening caN'- '
fully to the instructions of the Court and applying them to
the instructions, it wouldn't dispel your prejudice in tha~
effect? " She answered, "I have thought it over and I don
,

[70 C.2d
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, 334-~ [1

think 1 could." It is impossible to determine from this
exchange whether the prospective juror believed that her
prejudice would affect her decision on the issue of guilt or
only her decision on the issue of penalty. She did not state
that her opposition to the death penalty would prevent her
from voting for that penalty without regard to the evidence.
Accordingly, she did not make "unmistakably clear" either
that she would automatically vote against the death penalty or
that her attitude toward the death penalty would prevent her
from making an impartial decision on the issue of guilt.
The seventh prospective juror whose exclusion is in question stated that "1 guess I feel strongly that 1 could not"
return a verdict of death. After another question she stated,
"1 think I could go into it [the penalty phase] with an open
mind. 1 'm afraid what I feel-I don't know." The prosecutor then stated, "You indicated to us earlier you didn't think
that you could return a verdict of death. It is an awesome
thing. I know it. We want people w~th no strong feelings one
way or the other, neutral people. . . . Do you feel from everything that has been said that you do not have an open mind
on the matter of punishment involved in a capital case-that
there is nothing wrong with it." The prospective juror
answered, "I feel I do not," and was then excused. Here
again there was a failure to meet the Witherspoon requirements for exclusion for cause.
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In
all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
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Peters, J., T6briner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan.
J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
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